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 Abstract 
This paper suggests a new theoretical approach to study intermediary institutions, 
particularly intermediary institutions at the science policy nexus. These intermediary 
institutions that have a mediating role between science and politics have often been 
approached from the perspective of ‘boundary organizations’. But this model, that 
incorporates assumptions of principal-agent theory, is not fit for capturing case studies (of 
intermediary institutions) in ambiguous governance contexts. I argue that to understand new 
intermediary institutions, we need a new theoretical vocabulary to grasp how intermediary 
institutions emerge and how they work in practice. For example, discourses such as 
‘responsible development of innovation’ can sediment in new institutional settings, including 
for example new monitoring and observatory institutions. However, there is a lack of systemic 
studies of the material implications that the rise of these new governance actors –such as 
intermediary institutions—has for governing emerging technologies. This paper addresses 
this gap by analysing the shortcomings of a nanotechnology observatory project. Along the 
example of this observatory institution for nanotechnology, I will show that political 
discourse theory allows us to explain critically the conditions of possibility for the emergence 
of such institutions. Complemented with actor-network theory, these anti-essentialising 
approaches help us to see the materiality of intermediary governance actors. 
 
Introduction 
The governance of scientific and technological development has been changing in the last two 
decades. Most striking is the increased number and heterogeneity of actors (Van der Meulen 
& Rip 1996), which is why science governance no longer can be seen as a twofold 
relationship between governments and sciences. The term ‘governance’ in itself 
acknowledges a rethinking of the studying of government power and a blurring of 
traditionally clear distinctions between state, societies, and markets. This context gave way to 
a range of actors who intermediate between research practice, policy, society, and economy. 
The increase of such intermediary actors has given rise to studying their roles in innovation 
(Howells 2006). Intermediaries take on abundant roles and functions ranging from 
‘knowledge brokers’ (Meyer 2010) to ‘translators of ideas’ or ‘bridging institutions’ that link 
players within a technology system (Howells 2006). This paper focuses on a particular 
category of intermediaries that work as institutions (such as research councils, advisory 
bodies, or university organizations) at a strategic level between policy and research 
performance levels (Van der Meulen & Rip 1998:757). 
The intermediary institutions that are placed at a strategic level between policy and science 
have classically been approached from principal-agent models and the perspective of 
‘boundary organizations (Howell 2006:717). This conceptualization might have been fit for 
the purpose of studying traditional intermediary organizations that operated mainly bilaterally, 
for instance between government and sciences or between research laboratories and 
small/medium sized firms (Van Lente, Hekkert, Smits & Waveren 2003). However, principal-
agent theory and concepts such as ‘boundary organizations’ have been criticized. For Guston, 
such institutions function as sites of negotiating and demarcating scientific and political 
authority (Kearnes & Wienroth 2011:170). But Miller (2001) points out that this simplifies 
and overuniversalizes both science and politics without being able to account for context, 
fuzziness, and dynamics (483-484). Drawing on critical policy analysis, I aim to overcome 
these weaknesses by developing approaches to intermediary institutions that can provide 
contextualized explanations of the emergence and work of intermediary actors. 
This article suggests a new approach to deal with the dynamics between intermediaries and 
science, government, and society. Such an approach would do justice to the new types of 
intermediary institutions that have emerged in the last decade, and ‘that operate at network or 
system level, in contrast to the more traditional intermediaries that tend to focus on bilateral 
relations’ (Van Lente et.al. 2003:243). Rejecting the idealized relation between principal and 
agent, I suggest considering the relationship between intermediaries and their environment as 
a back-and-forth of constructing demands, of localized and idiosyncratic interpretations of 
policy discourses, and of material and structural constraints in practice. To approach these 
dynamics I propose a discursive approach that refocuses analytical attention on the movement 
and translation of certain logics in a policy space. By drawing on the concept of logics, I 
assert that analysts are equipped with a new theoretical vocabulary that puts them in a position 
to analyse intermediary institutions from an anti-essentialising, dynamic perspective. 
This article will first carve out the conceptual problems that existing approaches to 
intermediary institutions have in a context of governance. I will then show how a discursive-
material approach responds to the challenges of studying governance institutions that adapt an 
intermediary role. In the remainder of the paper, I will illustrate the benefit of such a 
theoretical approach along the case study of an observatory project on nanotechnologies. The 
ObservatoryNANO was a European project with the goal of observing nanosciences and 
nanotechnology developments to support European policy-makers. The observations should 
range from economic and scientific analyses to consideration of social and ethical impacts, 
impacts on environment, health, and safety, as well as developments in regulation and 
standardisation2. My analysis will show how the formation of this new intermediary 
institution in the form of a nanotechnology observatory is interwoven with a discourse of 
responsible development. I will argue that the hegemony of ‘responsible development’ 
triggered new demands (such as keeping a balance between benefits and risks, anticipation, 
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monitoring, and early engagement) and therewith formed the condition of possibility for a 
new intermediary institution. In a second step, I will show with the case of the 
ObservatoryNANO how different logics are at work in the practices of intermediary 
institutions. 
 
Theory: Toward a Critical Explanation 
The study of intermediaries is of immediate interest for many research fields. One such is the 
relatively new field of transition studies, which considers intermediaries as vital in connecting 
various actors, projects, or policy goals in a multi-level-perspective to sustainable transition 
(Van Lente et al. 2003, Boon, Moors, Kuhlmann & Smits 2011). Typically, the relevant 
literature probes the functions of intermediaries, such as their capacity to weave together 
networks and actors, to articulate options and demands, and to enable learning processes. The 
study of intermediaries is also important in the study of science politics interfaces, which 
considers intermediaries as necessary actors for organizing the cooperation between politics 
and science (Guston 1999, Van der Meulen & Rip 1998, Kearnes & Wienroth 2011). 
The predominant theoretical approach for studying science politics intermediaries is the 
approach of ‘boundary organizations’ which David Guston developed based on a combination 
of the concepts ‘boundary drawing’ and ‘boundary object’ on the one hand, and principal-
agent theory on the other (Guston 1999). Principal-agent theory sets out to examine the 
relationship between science and society. According to its structural framing, the government 
is the ‘principal’ and researchers are the ‘agents.’ In this contractual relationship, the 
principals delegate the work of generating knowledge and innovation to the researchers, who 
in turn receive incentives, such as research funds (Guston 1999:91). However, politicians are 
frequently unable to promote economically important innovations, and scientists are often 
incompetent in applying research to innovation. This is where intermediary organizations, 
such as technology-transfer offices, come in. They form what Guston calls ‘boundary 
organisations’ that create a space for mutual collaboration. Often, they include actors from 
both sides of the boundary, they are accountable to each side, and they form boundary objects 
that enable communication across these boundaries (Guston 2001:400-401). 
With the turn to governance, abundant new institutions mediating between science and 
governments arose and it has become challenging to grasp them with an approach that is 
based on a rather clear-cut dichotomy between principals and agents. The problem is two 
assumptions implied by principal-agent theory. First, that every actor pursues his own self-
interest and therefore needs monitoring. In contrast, individuals do not always act 
instrumentally and they do not necessarily have clear-cut preferences (Griggs 2006: 173ff). In 
addition, the focus on simplified, individual patterns of action oversees the uncertainties, 
complexities and ambiguities in decision-making processes (ibid.:178) that increase in 
governance contexts. Second, principal-agent theory assumes that there are actors that can 
clearly be ascribed to the area of politics on the one hand and actors that belong to science on 
the other, and that we need institutions to mediate between these two sides. In this model, 
science, politics, and intermediaries are united in a mutual contract, and functions are 
delegated between these three classes of actors. In a governance context, however, new 
intermediary institutions arise in various different forms and contexts, such as science 
museums, stakeholder forums, or observatories. Importantly, these new institutions frequently 
have in common that they are made up of and intermediate between many different actors 
from science, government, and society. Thus, in a governance situation, a whole range of new 
actors, also intermediary actors, emerge that do not easily fit into the model of principal-agent 
theory. For instance, the delegation processes and functions are not clear-cut in complex and 
contingent governance settings. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) highlight this in their influential 
work about governance in the network society: 
Characteristically, these new spaces of politics initially exist in an institutional void: 
there are no pre-given rules that determine who is responsible, who has authority over 
whom, what sort of accountability is to be expected. (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003:9) 
As a result of the turn to governance, traditional approaches such as principal-agent models 
and ‘boundary organizations’ can no longer sufficiently grasp the interactions of 
intermediaries. As the quotation above by Hajer and Wagenaar illustrates, it is no longer clear 
who has authority over whom, who belongs to which side, which functions are distributed, 
and who is delegating what. For example, principal-agent theory provided the explanation that 
an intermediary institution emerged—such as the chemical division of a regulatory agency—
because the government delegated power to control scientific and technological developments 
to this chemical regulations division. However, in a governance context, a multitude of 
heterogeneous actors are involved in scientific and technological developments as well as in 
the governance of research and development. Now, an intermediary institution might, for 
example, emerge without a clear mandate, so that the question of “why did this intermediary 
emerge” is suddenly an open question and is not reducible to an obvious process of 
delegation. In sum, it might no longer be clear who the agents, the principals, and the actors of 
intermediary institutions are, how they can be differentiated from one another, and what their 
functions are. This is due to a hetereogenization of actors and the emergence of a variety of 
mechanisms and strategies in new governance contexts (Gottweis 2005). We see that the turn 
to governance has increased uncertainty. 
Considering this uncertainty, I propose shifting the focus of research away from idealized 
explanations of intermediary institutions toward the analysis of context-based case studies and 
to address specific questions: what were the conditions of possibility for a particular 
intermediary institution to emerge, what characterizes its practices, and how can we evaluate 
its success in this particular context? Hence, I argue that, in a governance context, we should 
not strive for applying generalizable theoretical models such as principal-agent theory or 
‘boundary organizations’; instead, our analytical focus should be on the micro-level of 
specific cases of intermediary institutions. This suggestion is based on the assumption that 
reality does not precede the mundane practices in which we interact, but is rather shaped 
within those practices3 (Mol 1999:75). Thus, all entities are produced in relation to each other 
(Law 1999:5f), and realities are ‘historically, culturally and materially located’ (Mol 
1999:75). The ontology of such an approach acknowledges that the conditions of possibility 
are not given (Howarth 2000); thus, the approach would do justice to the radical contingency 
of reality and to the importance of context. In both actor-network theory (ANT) and political 
discourse theory (Howarth 2000, Torfing 1999, Howarth & Glynos 2007), we can find 
theoretical and methodological approaches that acknowledge ambiguity and contingency. 
Drawing on these two bodies of literature, I will outline a threefold framework for studying 
intermediary institutions that does justice to the uncertainty characterizing the governance 
contexts in which new intermediary institutions operate. 
First, we should analyse the conditions of possibility for an intermediary actor such as the 
ObservatoryNANO to emerge. I suggest that studies of intermediary institutions must 
consider the contextual embedding and historical situating of each intermediary institution. In 
other words, if it is assumed that a nanotechnology observatory is needed, then we must 
analyse how the conditions of possibility (necessity) have been established. Thus, the first aim 
of the analyst of an intermediary must be to interpret social practices by situating their 
meanings in broader historical and structural contexts (Howarth 2000: 11–12). In this respect, 
the approach that this paper employs can be categorized as one branch within an ‘institutional 
constructivism’ that draws on recent post-structuralist approaches to policy analysis. When 
we approach intermediary institutions from this angle, they are understood as 'sedimented 
discourses’ that, despite their contingent and fleeting political origins as products of 
hegemonic practices, have become relatively permanent and durable (Howarth 2000: 120). 
Importantly, for our purposes the term ‘discourse’ does not mean discussion or 
communication strategies; rather, discourse refers to a specific set of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in social and political practices 
(Hajer 1997:110f). In short, a new intermediary institution emerges in a context in which a 
certain discourse, for instance the ‘responsible development of nanotechnology,’ became 
hegemonic. 
Nevertheless, in a second step, I argue that we must not take this ‘sedimented terrain’ (West 
2011:428) for granted. Once a discourse has sedimented—and thus an intermediary actor has 
emerged—we must analyse what characterizes its social practices. The problem is that an 
intermediary can be taken as a black box and indeed often is recognized as a black box 
(Latour 2005:39). Thus, an intermediary actor is an actor that translates between actors, but 
‘[h]ow the actors inside the black boxes transform or translate inputs into outputs becomes 
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unimportant’ (Kaghan & Bowker 2001:258). This is a problem if, for example, we want to 
find out how illusive visions such as responsible development or reflective governance are 
translated into concrete policy practices. My argument is that we need to open this black box 
and interrogate into intermediary practices. Therefore, I suggest that Latour’s definition of the 
‘mediators’ (which he indeed conceptualizes as the opposite of intermediaries) provides a 
fruitful guiding definition for understanding intermediaries. To that end, read “intermediary 
institution” instead of “mediators” in the following quotation: 
Mediators, […], cannot be counted as just one; they might count for one, for nothing, 
for several, or for infinity. Their input is never a good predictor of their output; their 
specificity has to be taken into account every time. Mediators transform, translate, 
distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry. (Latour 
2005:39) 
Hence, I introduce a definition of intermediary institutions that points to their contextuality 
and to the contingent, multidirectional practices they engage in when they translate 
information to different actor networks in the field. This definition also indicates why the 
application of principal-agent theory is a problem (and especially so in complex, dynamic 
governance contexts): the intermediary institution can never be a clearly definable entity 
standing between actors, but it is indeed an actor network participating in different actor 
networks with a fluidity of memberships and roles. It follows from this that in the study of 
intermediaries we should focus our analytical attention on the movements and translations of 
the intermediary institution. Focusing on the translation work done within the intermediary is 
important because intermediaries ‘do not only move knowledge, but they also produce a new 
kind of knowledge: brokered knowledge’ (Meyer 2010). 
Intermediaries are not passive […] They force, tear out, knit together; they have tools 
and techniques for isolating, measuring, testing. Nothing is given in advance for them. 
(Hennion 1989:402) 
This quotation by Hennion alludes to the dynamics of movements and translations that occur 
in the practices of the intermediary. Therefore, we need to shift our analytical attention to the 
level of practice. 
I have suggested that we should first analyse the conditions of possibility for an intermediary 
actor to emerge and that we should then study the intermediary’s practices. However, a study 
that stops at that point would provide only detailed, context-based case studies without 
significance for the work of intermediaries in general. Thus, while idealized approaches run 
into danger of subsuming concrete cases under universal concepts (such as boundary 
organizations or principal agent), the empirical study as I have proposed it so far would likely 
limit any explanation of an intermediary in question to the particular context of the case 
(Glynos & Howarth 2007). 
Third, and finally, the theoretical and methodological approach of the study of intermediary 
institutions that I propose here therefore asks what is coherent in the analysed practices of the 
intermediary in question and what characterizes these practices on a more general level. It is 
because of this targeted context-based generalisation that we need a new theoretical 
vocabulary. To get at how to characterize practices, we must introduce the concept of ‘logics’. 
In essence, ‘logics’ refers to a coherent or programmatic way of acting (Anderson 2010:78). 
In other words, logics characterize the purpose, form, and content of practices (Glynos & 
Howarth 2007:106). What makes the concept so useful is that logics always are ‘contextual 
entities, arising in particular historical and political circumstances’ (Glynos & Howarth 
2007:137). In contrast to idealized accounts of intermediary organizations, logics thus allow 
us to consider context. But a logic nevertheless exceeds a specific case and characterizes a 
certain type of reasoning (Anderson 2010). Logics ‘work through a ‘mutual presupposition’ 
between the logic and the concrete assemblages of actors (the state, consultancies, think tanks, 
etc.) involved in governing liberal life’ (Anderson 2010:78). In other words, the logics 
concept bridges contingency and regularity, and it forms the third and final component of my 
threefold theoretical framework. 
In the second part of the paper I will use a case study to try out this threefold framework. The 
case study is an Observatory project for nanotechnologies, which can be characterized as an 
intermediary institution. The ObservatoryNANO was a European research project established 
in 2007 to observe and monitor developments in the nanotechnology field. This large project 
counted about 16 members in ten countries. Its main task was to observe scientific and 
technological developments in the nanotechnology field, to inform decision-makers with this 
up-to-date information, and to integrate diverse actors and topics in nanotechnology 
governance (i.e., the observations ranged from observing economic trends to considering 
ethical and social issues of nanotechnology). I worked on this project for two months in 2011 
within a work package through the Technical University of Darmstadt. Our task was to 
facilitate a critical self-evaluation by the participants of the project of the emerging model of a 
“nano-observatory”4. 
Methodologically, my first question (on the conditions of possibility for the emergence of an 
intermediary) can be answered by discourse analysis. In this paper, the respective section is 
based on a dissertation work on nanotechnology governance, including extensive document 
analysis and 35 narrative interviews (Åm 2011). Steps 2 and 3 (on practices and logics) ask 
for an enquiry into the situation of practices themselves (West 2011:423). Since our team 
from the Technical University of Darmstadt was involved in a work package of the 
ObservatoryNANO, we had good access to its practices as ‘observers of the observers.’ 
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Finally, I considered it useful to analyse reactions to the Observatory. For this purpose, I 
conducted interviews with 10 nanotechnology experts outside the Observatory and interviews 
with 4 governing board members. 
 
Conditions of Possibility for the ObservatoryNANO 
By taking the above suggested threefold framework into account, I will demonstrate in this 
sub-section the conditions of possibility that allowed the ObservatoryNANO to develop. First, 
however, we need a brief explanation of what nanotechnology is and how it is perceived and 
implemented. Nanotechnology is considered to be a systemic technology that induces 
pervasive transformations in society. In general, the characteristics of elements change at the 
nanoscale, because mechanical physical laws are interfered with by quantum mechanics 
(Kulinowski 2006:16). Nanotechnology seeks to use these changed characteristics for new 
products and new manufacturing processes that manipulate atoms and molecules. As a 
discipline, nanotechnology cuts across heterogeneous and previously unrelated research fields 
ranging from physics and micro-electronics to chemistry or molecular biology (Williams 
2006:331). In addition, nanotechnology appears to have endless possibilities of application. 
The potential applications of nanotechnology are so broad that nanotechnology is considered 
by some to be a panacea for almost any problem humankind faces (Kearnes & Macnaghten 
2006:282). Therefore, nanotechnologies take high priority in many research and development 
policies worldwide that consider nanotechnologies to be key technologies for the 21st century. 
However, appeals to the advances offered by nanotechnology cannot be divorced from the 
potential negative flipside of using these new properties that arise only at the nanoscale 
deliberately in nanotechnology. In short, it is uncertain but possible that nanomaterials bring 
new risks. For example, the element gold, which is yellow and inert as a bulk material, 
becomes red and toxic (Hunt 2006:49) in a certain particulate form. Since 2002, discussions 
have arisen about the environmental, health, and safety aspects of nanomaterials, as well as 
about the social and ethical impacts of nanotechnology. These discussions have been driven 
by rising dystopian fears that nanotechnology may be yet another technological development 
that could spin out of control and threaten life on earth, including humankind (Joy 2000, ETC 
Group 2003, Crichton 2002). To understand these fears, we should consider that 
nanotechnology emerged in the shadow of strong and pertinent environmental movements, 
public protests against genetic engineering, and a loss of trust in public institutions after the 
BSE crisis (Pidgeon & Rogers-Hayden 2007:194). Part of this policy legacy of the GMO and 
BSE experience is that the public dialogue on science-based policy-making and on the ethical, 
legal, and social aspects (ELSA) of science development became increasingly commonplace 
in Europe, eventually settling as a legitimate and expected feature in policy-making of 
technology governance. Policy-makers now often assume that greater public consultation can 
eliminate opposition to technical change by creating social consensus which is conceived as a 
necessary condition for the political acceptance of emerging technologies (Gottweis 
1998:276, Irwin 2006:299). 
Against this historical context, nanotechnology became largely regarded as offering an 
opportunity to apply ‘learned lessons’ in politics and ‘to get it right the first time’ (see, e.g., 
Goldenberg & Einsiedel 2006, Balbus, Denison, Florini & Walsh 2006, Kenneth & 
Thompson 2008, Metha 2006). From the first publications in nanotechnology governance and 
onward, the concept of responsible development has characterised the nanotechnology policy 
field. For example, the well-known UK Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 
(RS/RAEng) report on nanotechnology published in 2004 introduced the concept of 
responsible development, which it referred to as the means to “address many of the potential 
ethical, social, health, environmental, safety and regulatory impacts, and help to ensure that 
nanotechnologies develop in a safe and socially desirable way” (RS/RAEng 2004: 83). Since 
then, policy statements on nanotechnology frequently offer a thorough discussion of the 
ethical, societal, and health implications of a technology that is, supposedly, still in its 
infancy. Nanotechnology-related policy documents routinely recommend that nanotechnology 
should be handled responsibly, transparently, and with a willingness for dialogue. We see that 
the discourse of 'the responsible development of nanotechnology' managed to gain hegemony: 
[T]he various initiatives that constitute the emerging governance landscape of 
nanotechnology have culminated in the discourse of 'responsible development' which 
has materialized in recent years in nanotechnology policy. The discourse operates as a 
meta-framing of the governance of nanotechnology, emphasizing mechanisms that 
enable the 'benefits' of nanotechnology to be realized whilst innovating strategies for 
avoiding possible negative consequences. (Kearnes & Rip 2009: 114) 
As the quotation by Kearnes and Rip indicates, responsible development incorporates both 
advocates of nanotechnologies and its critics. The idea of a balance is crucial to the 
responsible development of nanotechnology: Its promise is to guarantee benefits and to ensure 
that there will not be negative effects. The ‘responsible development of nanotechnologies’ 
enacts a ‘coalition of ‘yes’-sayers’ that includes a range of actors from technophiles to 
sceptics (Nordmann & Schwarz 2010). The ‘responsible development’ concept is well-suited 
for this function, because it is an ambiguous concept that involves multiple meanings so that 
different views and opposing policy desires can be integrated (Jasanoff 2004: 27, Stone 2002: 
158). Central to the stabilization of responsible development as the hegemonic project in the 
nanotechnology field was, in addition to its ambiguity, the historical context of experiences 
with GMO. Nanotechnology governance came to be hailed as a turning point in approaching 
new technologies, whereas the governance of genetic engineering became cast as the 
dismissed Other. Policy-makers imagined that public protests could become a barrier to 
nanotechnology development, so united in the 'responsible development of nanotechnologies,' 
they endeavoured to pre-empt this threat (Åm 2011). 
Once the idea of the responsible development of nanotechnology caught on, the question 
emerged of how nanotechnology can be operationalized. Important elements in its 
operationalization are to anticipate developments and to come in early to steer developments 
before they veer in a negative direction. Therefore, upstream engagement, monitoring, and a 
better and wider foresight (anticipation) are (next to keeping a balance) important elements of 
the responsible development of nanotechnology. For the implementation of these elements, 
nanotechnology governance is marked by a search for appropriate institutional settings. For 
instance, the governance and regulation of nanotechnology reveal a proliferation of a range of 
voluntary mechanisms, particularly ‘codes of conduct’ for the ‘responsible development’ of 
nanoscience and technology. In addition, a range of intermediary organizations have been 
created – for example, the UK ‘Nanotechnology Stakeholder Forum’, the German ‘Nano-
Commission’, the ObservatoryNANO – to mediate between the research community, society, 
and policy-makers in the development of nanotechnologies. In the ObservatoryNANO, the 
balance, monitoring, and anticipatory elements are strongly present. 
In the ObservatoryNANO, we see efforts to maintain a balance in that the observations of the 
nanofield were planned to take place within a broader framework that also took account of 
ethical and societal issues; potential health, safety and environment impacts; and new 
regulations, legislations, and standards (ObservatoryNANO Proposal). The project 
operationalized “responsible development” in that the list of work packages included social 
and ethical issues, health and safety issues, as well as regulations, although the analysis of 
scientific, technological, and economical developments in the nano area was at the heart of 
the ObservatoryNANO project. Early drafts of the ObservatoryNANO project proposal show 
that the applicants were eager to demonstrate that potential eco and human risks of 
nanotechnologies received as much attention as the potential benefits of nanotechnologies. 
The applicants considered this balance to be essential for a successful proposal. 
In sum, we see that responsible development constitutes a hegemonic discourse that forms the 
conditions of possibility for institutions such as an ObservatoryNANO to emerge. In the next 
section, I will analyse how subjects in fact translated the discourse of ‘responsible 
development’ into practices by operating as an ObservatoryNANO intermediary institution. 
Responsible development and reflexive governance are highly valued, frequently cited, and 
yet ill-defined policy goals. How these elusive visions are translated into concrete policy 
practices, has been studied relatively little. A critical eye on the practices allows us to show 
how hegemonic discourses are reinforced but perhaps also resisted and loosened (West 
2011:428). Thus, rather than black-boxing the ObservatoryNANO as ‘responsible 
development’ institution, I will shed light on the ongoing work within it. 
 
Case Study: The ObservatoryNANO Project 
In 2008, the members of the newly established ObservatoryNANO project met for the first 
time in a workshop designed for them to get to know one another and to plan the work to be 
done in the next four years5. The project was funded by the EU FP7 programme. Its mandate 
was 
[t]o create a European Observatory on Nanotechnologies to present reliable, complete 
and responsible science-based and economic expert analysis, across different 
technology sectors, establish dialogue with decision makers and others regarding the 
benefits and opportunities, balanced against barriers and risks, and allow them to take 
action to ensure that scientific and technological developments are realized as socio-
economic benefits. (http://www.observatorynano.eu/project/about/ ) 
The task assigned to the ObservatoryNANO was, thus, to inform European policy through an 
‘objective analysis’ of nanotechnology development. In addition, we see in the quotation 
above that the mandate assigned the Observatory a proactive role to promote technological 
progress. The ObservatoryNANO brought together a range of actors6 who had been selected 
as part of an effort to collect leading European nanotechnology experts. From the beginning, 
six working groups were formed that would independently assess the impact of 
nanotechnology in various fields. In this composition of work packages, the nanotechnology 
field was organized as follows: science and technology assessment; economic impacts; ethical 
and societal impacts; regulation & standards; and environmental, health and safety impacts. 
Our team from the Technical University of Darmstadt was tasked with providing a critical 
self-evaluation of the project and thus to prepare the kind of reflection that is developed here. 
The composition of work packages reflects that the Observatory also wanted to monitor 
ethical and social issues of nanotechnology, as well as risk and regulatory aspects. We see 
thus how the project translated particular demands of a responsible-development discourse 
into the Observatory’s structure. 
We observed that the project quickly met the challenges of defining the object of interest, the 
methods, and the baseline against which learning and feedback mechanism shall occur: What 
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is it a nanotechnology observatory observes? An ideal observatory project or monitoring unit 
– be it on nanotechnologies, environmental pollution, or economic growth – should start its 
work by identifying knowledge gaps and with defining its object of interest. The problem of 
finding a focus was reinforced by the complexity of defining nanotechnologies. One 
governing board member brought the delicacy of the problem of defining nanotechnology to 
the point: 
If in three years, ‘nanotechnology’ as a term disappears, what’s the point of having a 
“nano-observatory”? There is no object of observation. The Observatory in this case 
would need to grasp the cross-linkages but this is difficult. (Interview material: 
Governing board member) 
We witnessed that the ObservatoryNANO discussed the issue of the object of observation in 
at least three distinct ways: One can, for example focus on a technology (focusing on the 
transfer from basic capabilities to selected applications), on a sector (focusing, e.g., on how 
the ‘green car’ is developing), or on policy instruments (focusing on their effect on 
technologies or sectors). 
Interesting about the ObservatoryNANO were the dynamics of how the project responded to 
the dynamic of the governance context in which it operated, when it was confronted with 
altered demands. Particularly interesting were, for example, the different moves the 
Observatory made in presenting results. In the beginning, the question of the addressees was 
prevalent, as when the setup of the homepage was discussed: Did the Observatory generate 
information for ‘the’ public, for the European Commission (EC), for the European Parliament, 
or for other researchers? However, the Observatory slowly adopted a consulting function 
mainly addressing the EC’s Department General (DG) for Research. The project also adapted 
to this addressee. After the first year, the project partners realized that policy-makers do not 
read 100-page reports. This initiated a learning process, which resulted in shorter, crispier 
reports that focused on what was considered to be hard facts. Two-page fact sheets became 
key deliverables. But the problem remained of how to convert a 100-page report into fact 
sheets. This process necessarily resulted in many omissions from and simplifications in the 
fact sheets. The full explanations and nuances remained in the long reports that the policy-
makers did not read. The process of changes in the ObservatoryNANO, the adaptations and 
attempts to optimize and a lack of discussion of the implications of these changes struck us in 
our participatory observations. That does not mean that there were no discussions at the 
ObservatoryNANO meetings. Indeed, dissonances occurred during the work period; for 
example, some participants were critical about what they perceived as an overemphasis by the 
Observatory on gathering economic data. The project leaders justified that focus by referring 
to the European Commission’s articulated demands. In fact, the project revealed the inherent 
difficulties of a holistic observatory that attempts to cover all aspects of nanotechnology. 
By 2012, the ObservatoryNANO had translated its observatory data into texts, including a 
map locating nanotechnology industries around the world, an ethical toolkit, and a European 
Nanotechnology Landscape Report. The results produced by the various working groups 
range from general sector reports on 10 selected technology sectors7 to briefings, factsheets, 
newsletters, and annual reports. These outcomes are of central importance for a theoretical 
perspective that considers the material effect of the institutionalisation of new intermediary 
institutions because these texts participate in a ‘circulation of transformations’ (Latour 
1999:22) in which nanotechnology is translated into texts and figures. The Landscape report 
is an illustrative example of how the Observatory worked. The report aimed at showing how 
nano-enabled solutions might contribute to solving so-called global challenges (such as an 
ageing population or a sustainable energy economy). This focus implies choices about what 
an observatory is actually observing: 
• Assessing potential nano-enabled solutions is not the same as assessing the state of 
nanotechnology in general. 
• Dead ends or slow developments are not registered. 
• Nanotechnology applications are not evaluated against, for instance, stated expectations 
and promises. 
• Nanotechnologically enabled solutions are not evaluated against other solutions, including 
non-technical ones. 
• The Observatory risks to reiterate stereotypical commonplace diagnosis of society’s 
problems. 
This list covers only the most critical problems with this kind of reports. In the following, I 
will critically explain problems as these on a more general level. 
 
Logics Employed by ObservatoryNANO in Navigating the Paradox Demands of the 
Governance Context 
In this section, I will examine the practices the Darmstadt team identified in the 
ObservatoryNANO on a more general level. The aim is to elicit what is coherent in these 
practices and to identify how these practices may be generic for certain kinds of intermediary 
institutions. To bundle and name these characteristics, I employ the logic concept. For this 
critical explanation, we complemented our own observations with an evaluation of the 
                                                            
7 Aerospace, automotive, and transport; agrifood; chemistry, materials, and construction; 
energy; environment; health, medicine, and nanobio; information and communications; 
security; textiles; patent analysis; and publication analysis. 
ObservatoryNANO by nanotechnology stakeholders, in particular, whether they found the 
kind of operation and functioning of the ObservatoryNANO to be productive or not.  
To start this critical explanation of the observed practices, it is useful to reflect on how the 
intermediary translates its object of interest (i.e., nanotechnology) into texts. In the case of the 
ObservatoryNANO, the intermediary institution does not only translate between human actors 
but also between nanotechnology (‘thing’) and complex assemblages of actors, such as the 
European Union. At the same time, the ObservatoryNANO does not represent ‘a 
nanotechnology’ because nanotechnology is not ‘out there’. In fact, the observers are forced 
to translate what nanotechnology is and might be ‘into [a] more or less standardized form in 
which its properties can be measured, recorded and made visible’ (Barry 2001:154). In the 
world that an observatory observes, nanotechnology is enacted in many different ways and 
places; ‘there are myriad practices which to the outside observer (and even to those immersed 
in those practices) appear to be trained on the same object but which are, in fact, enacting 
subtly different ‘realities’’ (West 2011:424). Thus, an observatory knits together pieces of 
information, producing a particular perspective on nanotechnology. Therefore, such an 
initiative would necessarily strive for a grid, which makes nanotechnology measurable and 
comparable. But this is exactly what the ObservatoryNANO did not manage; it did not 
compare and it could not compare due to shortcomings such as those listed in the bulleted list 
above. 
Therefore, the main addressee of the intermediary, the European Commission, was 
dissatisfied about the outcome of the Observatory. At the final workshop of the 
ObservatoryNANO, Christos Tokamanis, Head of Unit ‘Nano and converging Sciences and 
Technologies’ at DG Research, EC, took issue with the Observatory not devising a model of 
measuring progress. He wanted to know what products were on the market, what its nano-
content was, where they came from, why certain applications never become marketed, and 
what role public demands play in the process8. Tokamanis’s statement shows how governing 
institutions ‘are anxious to ensure that economies are performing technologically and that 
measures exist to monitor their performance, in order that it might be improved’ (Barry 
2001:210). Unfortunately, the Observatory did not and could not satisfy these demands 
because of the complexity of the nanotechnology field and because of competing expectations 
about its performance. 
Indeed, the output of the Observatory could not reduce uncertainty because its work did not 
merely describe nanotechnology; rather, it contributed to bringing a certain perspective on 
nanotechnology into being. This might be particularly true for the Observatory’s estimation of 
future developments. As a matter of course, ObservatoryNANO included forecasts in its 
work. A logic of forecasting could be said to characterize the Observatory’s reports on science 
and technology developments. Indeed, many intermediaries take on the task of foresight. 
                                                            
8 ObservatoryNANO Final Workshop, 1 March 2012, Brussels; compiled from notes by participants. 
Exercises in foresight are part of consulting governments on how to set priorities in science 
policy (Van der Meulen & Rip 1998:758). This fits a general trend in governance contexts 
that governments, in order to act as a centre, must accumulate facts, particularly in the form of 
statistics, about the field being governed (Miller & Rose 2010:66). These calculations act 
upon reality in a particular way. Ebeling (2008) concluded that foresighting into the 
nanomarket essentially contributed to creating the field. In the effort to build a new 
technological market out of nanotechnologies, actors make a multiplicity into a singularity - 
nanotechnologies become 'nanotechnology' - and a widely dispersed marketing potential 
becomes a single market (Ebeling 2008: 346). 
If we accept that there are various forms to enact ‘nanotechnology observing’, it might seem 
obvious that participants of the Observatory make a choice. However, the nanotechnology 
observers did not acknowledge the extent to which they operated as filters, because they 
presumed that doing so could take away their legitimacy. Thus, many practises linked to the 
ObservatoryNANO were marked by a strong belief in – what was considered neutral – expert 
knowledge and wish for scientific procedures. The aim of the ObservatoryNANO project was 
to deliver ‘facts’ without recommendations. I conceptualize these practices as governed by a 
logic of scientification, a term that captures how the social practices of the observatory 
members – and especially of the leadership– were marked by demands for factuality and 
evidence-gathering. In such moves of scientification, nanotechnology is articulated as 
technical matter (in contrast to it being a potentially controversial, political matter) (Åm 
2011). However, this ignores the profound interventions of intermediaries. The results of 
observatories influence decision-making. At the same time, observatories take important 
decisions themselves, which may include decisions on structures, on focus, on which 
information to choose, as well as decisions on methods or on the presentation of methods. To 
guarantee the legitimacy of the results produced, it is therefore tremendously important to 
provide for rigour and transparency in these constituting decisions. 
The question then is whether the ObservatoryNANO established and followed protocols for 
taming the differences and confronting them, or whether differences were simply held in 
abeyance and with what consequences (West 2011:425). We observed that these decision 
moments were not explicit in the Observatory’s work. Even for those who were part of this 
project, these moments were not detectable. Categorisations and the way forward developed 
continuously and over time. But we do not wish to criticize this here. In fact, our practice-
oriented approach assumes that decision-making necessarily is messy, unplanned, and often 
silent. However, it is important to acknowledge that the ObservatoryNANO did not reflect 
upon this. 
There is in fact an irony in that the ObservatoryNANO operated along a logic of 
scientification when at the same time it was committed to ‘responsible development’ that 
promotes constant awareness of the implications of actions. In contrast to the responsible 
development demands for transparency and dialogue, the belief in science and neutral 
knowledge, expressed in a logic of scientification, masked practical problems and human 
decisions in defining the field, the variables, and the methods. Actors explained away the 
multiplicity (West 2011:422). This contradiction led to ambivalent evaluations of the 
Observatory by our interviewees; several of whom addressed the intransparency of choices 
and the lack of reflectiveness as issues. 
This problem that the logic of scientification constitutes to responsible development is 
founded in the ambivalent mandate of the Observatory that wants the intermediary to provide 
for impartial expert analysis but at the same time demands that it take action to support 
nanotechnology’s development. One interviewee made a general recommendation for any 
kind of observatory: 
Everything which is connected to lobbying or which has a touch of clientelism has to 
be eliminated; otherwise the information provided is not legitimate for political 
consulting. (Interview material: Economist) 
And another interviewee said explicitly about the ObservatoryNANO: 
If you are observing, you should just observe. Don't make nanotechnology sexy, don't 
make the public trust, but make nanotechnology trustworthy. An observatory should 
stand above the pro and the con side. (Interview material: ELSI expert) 
The last quotation reveals that, in the interviewee’s opinion, the Observatory did not live up to 
the ideal of maintaining the balance between risks and benefits that is central to responsible 
development. Both of these quotations illustrate that intermediaries are faced with strong 
demands for impartiality. In fact, a neutral and independent position of intermediary actors is 
generally presumed (Klerkx & Leeuwis 2009). That is, a logic of scientification might be a 
generic feature of the practices of intermediary institutions, even though my analysis stresses 
that this aim is not achievable because of all the choices involved in knowledge production. 
In addition, the ObservatoryNANO’s ignorance about its own role as an actor reveals the key 
paradox of new intermediary institutions in governance contexts: The organization does not 
operate along a clear-cut line of who the actors and who the intermediaries are, as supposed 
by principal-agent theory. Indeed, there is no difference between the observers, the observed, 
the actors, and the stakeholders in the ObservatoryNANO. Apparently no one in the 
organization considered it necessary ‘to describe the social world from an ‘exterior’ position 
that removes the observer from the world being described’ (Laurent 2011). This is in fact the 
main problem of observing: There are no observations without an observer. Hence, there are 
no observations without interventions. This is a general problem of new intermediaries in 
governance contexts: ‘the position of intermediary organizations is contested because they are 
in interaction with a heterogeneous set of actors, and their objectives and functions are not as 
well-defined as those of other actors in the innovation system’ (Boon et al. 2011:250). 
Paradoxically, intermediaries are often demanded, but once they have been established, actors 
do not know how to use them and the intermediaries can become to be perceived as 
expending funds on a process that would be achieved anyway by other means (Klerkx & 
Leeuwis 2009:857). One of our interview quotes illustrates this paradox clearly: 
For me, the ObservatoryNANO is not a source I would consult, when I am looking for 
something. When I need information, I go into my networks. There are already so 
many actors around. And these actors, that are there, they are trustworthy and they 
make relevant statements. And … I have never heard anybody (and I am really much 
around in Brussels and other areas) who would refer to the ObservatoryNANO. 
Nobody quotes these reports. Hence, this is no source [that] I would use. (Interview 
material: Industry representative) 
This quotation points to the prevalent heterogeneity of governance actors and exemplifies 
why our critique of the ObservatoryNANO must be balanced against the governance context 
in which intermediary institutions operate today. Shortcomings are grounded not merely in the 
logics of the Observatory but in its context, as well. In general, the ‘attention-deficit’ of 
policy-makers was a topic of concern for those involved in the Observatory. In the beginning, 
the Observatory was dedicated to delivering facts and it provided long and detailed reports. 
However, the project members learned that policy-makers do not take the time to read such 
lengthy reports. A respondent said: 
This is a general problem, and indeed the question of mandate (neutral knowledge, 
information generation) and policy-making cannot be resolved. Policy-makers give 
money to produce information, but then they don’t want to read the reports. But they 
also do not read the factsheets. In fact, what they need are indications [of] whether 
they should do something or not. The best you can expect from an Observatory as this 
one is to create awareness of possible issues. (Interview material: ELSA expert) 
In a similar vein, Bernadette Bensaude Vincent wrote in a critical comment on the 
Observatory in 2012 that the European Commission required that the reports be shorter and 
shorter, but even two-page factsheets proved too long to receive attention. Therefore, we must 
consider in the analysis of intermediary institutions that intermediaries are in competition for 
the attention of policy-makers in a governance landscape marked by a multitude of actors. 
Governance is about not only a functional re-organization of politics but also about power 
relations. Certain developments in the ObservatoryNANO that changed the mandate of 
providing knowledge into the practice of providing recommendations (such as the move to 
factsheets) must be seen as strategies to meet these challenges. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I introduced a theoretical perspective to address the conditions of possibility for 
the emergence and practices of a new intermediary institution. The issue at stake for 
intermediaries in a governance context is uncertainty (expressed in contingency, 
contextuality, and a heterogeneity of actors). The issue at stake for studies on intermediaries is 
that a principal-agent approach is not fit to grasp and explain the work of new intermediary 
actors that emerge in dynamic governance contexts. Taken together, my approach enables a 
mode of enquiry that aims to understand the conditions of possibility for the rise of new 
intermediary institutions, their programs or governing instruments, and their contingent, 
multidirectional practices of operation. I first provided a discursive understanding of 
conditions of possibility for the emergence of the ObservatoryNANO project by situating it 
within the context of the hegemonic discourse ‘responsible development of 
nanotechnologies.’ I then showed how the ‘responsible development of nanotechnology’ is 
translated into practices by the ObservatoryNANO. I argued that the Observatory—
necessarily—enacted nanotechnology and ‘nanotechnology observing’ in a particular way, 
although without awareness. The Observatory subscribed to a strong belief in scientific, and 
thus supposedly neutral and objective, knowledge in order to gain legitimacy. But this was 
exactly how it lost legitimacy: It did not acknowledge its own role as actors and thus 
disappointed demands of a ‘responsible development’ discourse such as transparency and 
reflectiveness. Finally, it could not commit enough actors to stabilize the project so that it did 
not turn into a permanent institution. 
I introduced logics as new theoretical vocabulary for the study of intermediaries. By way of 
summary, I characterized the operation of the ObservatoryNANO, which is an ambiguous 
intermediary institution, along two concepts. For the first dimension, I used the label logic of 
forecasting, which refers to how the practices of the Observatory are characteristic of a certain 
type of reasoning that brings the future in a calculable form by estimating how 
nanotechnology-related markets would develop. The second dimension I labelled logic of 
scientification, which captures how the Observatory assumed that the assemblage of actors for 
which the results of the Observatory should be relevant (e.g., the EC’s DG Research) 
expected statistical calculations, and how it aligned its practices along these presumptions. 
What makes the concept so useful for future studies of the governance of science is that 
‘logics’ are contextual entities. They exceed the particular case and provide a link to context. 
For example, the logic of foresight shows that broader foresight assessments, which I 
observed in the practices of the case study, are an expression of a particular historical and 
political circumstance (viz., the responsible development of nanotechnology). At the same 
time, I argue that both logics observed in this case say something more general about how 
new intermediary institutions work at the science policy nexus: Intermediaries want to 
provide policy guidance with evaluations of future developments, and they claim to provide 
neutral expert knowledge. In other words, the 'logic' approach is important because it reveals 
what characterizes the practices of intermediary institutions beyond my analysed case. In sum, 
the logic concept is important to get a grip on the complexity, contingency, and materiality of 
practices and to show how the practices are intertwined with certain conditions of possibility. 
Certainly, my claims with respect to employing this three-fold framework combining political 
discourse theory and actor-network theory to the study of intermediary institutions necessitate 
testing regarding for their applicability. It is important that the analysis suggested here not be 
misunderstood. For one, I do not at all suggest that one should analyse how much 
intermediaries act according to a logic of scientification or forecasting. Rather, I suggest that 
the emergence and work of any intermediary institution first has to be comprehended within 
its context. If an analyst, for instance, studies architects in consultant companies and their 
intermediary role in households’ climate adaption, she must understand the context of the 
building sector in a certain region and issues such as occupational identity. Second, if we too 
quickly come to assume that an intermediary works according to its mandate or program, we 
will gloss over idiosyncratic interpretations of policy discourses or over new and unexpected 
practices and over the logics informing them. An architect consultant that presents himself as 
a sustainable actor might, for instance, in fact engage in ‘green-washing’ while other 
architects might promote energy efficient solutions without promoting her sustainable 
consultancy role. Third, we must evaluate the work of the intermediary against its context and 
supposed function, because an intermediary does not become an actor by itself. Indeed, it is 
the intermediary’s subjectivity, intentionality, and morality and how it hooks up with other 
circulating entities that provides an intermediary with actoriality (Latour 1999:19). Therewith, 
this paper is also an appeal for researchers of the governance of science to study 
intermediaries empirical with ethnographic, praxis-oriented methodologies. Digging into the 
‘complexity of the empirical’ (Barry 2001:22) offers the only way to identify the potential 
gaps between intended policy program, such as responsible development, and the contingency 
of how messy practices turn out to be. 
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